China's rise over the past decade has corresponded with the decline of the United States in the liberal international system, both economically, and after two wars in Afghanistan and troops with partner nation counterparts. Utilizing an innovative and small footprint methodology, the SPP targets repetitive engagements, between two to three times per year, to establish partnerships of trust and reciprocity that simply cannot be achieved on a larger scale, or within the active duty military, where leadership swap-outs are routine. In an almost "under the radar" fashion, SPP relationships hedge against uncertainty by laying soft power steps that can lead to a hard power path if required in the future. 
Introduction
"Gentlemen, we have run out of money; now we have to think." Attributed to Sir Winston Churchill, this imperative captures the essence of 2013's newly inaugurated second term presidency. On the heels of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, confronted with partisan polarity in the Congress, and having narrowly averted the fiscal cliff, 1 
the United
States is in a strategic pause between yesterday's threats and tomorrow's vulnerabilities. Put succinctly, in the current budget environment, we can either choose to do less with less, or we can seek to do more of what we are doing now, differently. 2 In this increasingly fragmented and chaotic environment, American grand strategy must match diminishing means to rapidly shifting ends. Meanwhile, China's rise to regional superpower status will occupy a considerable portion of U.S. strategic thinking for decades to come.
In the face of a rising China, the U.S. should expand its alliance portfolio in Asia, but do so in the least provocative manner possible. Cooperation and robust alliance engagement allow the United States to burden share its security costs in a fiscally constrained environment without threatening its legitimacy either at home or abroad. Another way of characterizing this cooperation is to say that the United States is "rebalancing" to Asia. But what does rebalancing look like and how much does it cost? What tools exist in America's foreign policy toolkit to pursue this rebalance? The National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP) has a 20-year history of cementing alliances between America and partner nations for pennies on the dollar.
Especially when viewed through a budget crisis lens, the SPP should be vastly expanded in the Pacific to signal to our Asian allies that the United States is committed to both peace and prosperity for all within the region. and is projected to eclipse America's defense budget by 2035. 4 The threat is that China, armed with an anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capability could "use pinpoint ground attack and antiship missiles, a growing fleet of modern submarines and cyber and anti-satellite weapons to destroy or disable another nation's military assets from afar." 5 It has been 20+ years since the United States has had its military supremacy challenged. Hawks, alarmed by two decades worth of rapid growth, argue that China's intentions are sufficiently vague as to warrant immediate confrontation. More convinced "that it is hardly unnatural for a rising power to aspire to have armed forces that reflect its growing economic clout," 6 doves caution restraint. In between is a mix of "military strength with diplomatic subtlety" 7 that simultaneously recognizes China's regional ascendancy and protects America's national interests abroad.
China's Rise
Written
U.S Rebalance to Asia
The Obama administration has pursued this middle option of mixing military strength with diplomacy by rebalancing toward Asia. Thus far, however, the rebalance has been lacking in substance. President Obama formalized America's pivot toward Asia in a November 2011 address to the Australian parliament. Suggesting a strategic window of opportunity, President
Obama reflected that "after a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific Panetta also dispelled the notion that America's rebalance to Asia amounts to a challenge to China: "I reject that view entirely." 12 Though synchronized initially, criticism of the rebalance to Asia is clear: rhetoric has not been matched by substantive action. Skeptics of the rebalance warn that the U.S. must be careful not to overpromise, especially in the midst of historic budget cuts. 13 The SPP is a tangible solution to help fill the gap between policy platitudes and quantitative measurements of U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. especially by expanding into Asia, is an "off-the-shelf" remedy to the suggestions prescribed by the QDR, NSS, and NMS.
Importance of Cementing Regional Alliances
The SPP, by leveraging the hard and soft power of the United States in the international system, should look to its next 20 years of engagement activity with optimism. Consider the following remarks from a leading political scientist: "In international politics, no agency or institution guarantees security and prosperity. The United States should find it heartening, however, that its position in the world and the most important causes of security cooperation among states combine to favor it. These conclusions do not mean that U.S. alliances are indestructible, that isolationism is preferable, or that Western defense capabilities could not be improved. What they do mean is that the United States could hardly ask for much more." 20 Stephen Walt's observations from 1987 apply to the United States as much today as they did at the peak of the Cold War: threats abound, alliances cannot be taken for granted, and countries around the world still favor a relationship with the United States.
The United States must capitalize on these potentially ephemeral realities to explore new security partnerships, but without emboldening existing and future allies to the point where they become unduly provocative toward China. Shrewd diplomacy will be vital in striking this balance. Walt, in December 2012, restated this delicate equilibrium. "Alliances will be central to America's Asia policy. The United States is a hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, but our ability to operate in other theatres-including Asia-depends on support from allies.
Furthermore, given that our main strategic goal in Asia is to maintain a regional balance of power, supporting key allies is an inescapable element of our entire approach." 21 Under the scrutiny of intense fiscal pressure, however, yesterday's model of vast sums of foreign and military aid is untenable.
The Obama administration, while signaling to China and surrounding nations that cementing regional alliances is a crucial component of the rebalance toward Asia, concedes that budgetary limitations will both shape and constrain future security commitments. Andrew J. engagement." 22 He went on to say: "At a time when the U.S. government is looking for costeffective ways to achieve its strategic objectives at home and abroad, security cooperation with allies and partners is an increasingly important national security priority. As Secretary Clinton noted recently, 'building coalitions for common action is becoming both more complicated and more crucial.'" 23 Driven principally by fiscal limitations, the United States must count on its allies to share a higher proportion of the security burden going forward.
National Guard State Partnership Program
The National Guard's State Partnership Program is a cost-effective, threat-based model of theatre security cooperation where unexpected benefits and the value of trust built over time have been recognized by the highest levels of leadership within the military. The program is more than theoretical; it boasts an impressive 20-year history.
The SPP is a "robust proof of concept" 24 
SPP-The Threat Drives the Solution
The threats to America's national interests can be broadly categorized into "three long- 
SPP-A Model of Trust
The SPP, rejecting a "theatre security cooperation in a box" mentality, acknowledges that relationships and trust take time to develop. A mature SPP relationship can be understood as a multi-year phenomenon. 28 During the first year of a security partnership, the formal, icebreaking handshake is like any other cordial introduction. The second year of the partnership takes on a personal element after drinking tea, having lunch, examining cultural differences, and exchanging ideas for the fourth or fifth time. Relational dynamics then get interesting;
persistence beyond the third year causes partner countries to realize you're different than everyone else, American or otherwise. Dialogue, between the same sergeants, captains, and generals, suddenly becomes substantive. Mr. Thomas Niblock, Political & Foreign Policy
Advisor to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, describes the SPP payoff through a financial metaphor: "Looked at another way, what the SPP brings is the benefits of compounded interest in the relationship. The way we frequently engage with our partner states is akin to investing $500 in an IRA each year, with little or no interest. American contacts come and go, lessons are re-learned every 9 or 12 months, and we keep running around the relay, passing the baton to the next contact. The SPP builds the knowledge of the human terrain, the culture, and the issues year on year-compounding our knowledge and our mutual benefit-so that after 5-10 years we are materially better off than with most traditional partnering approaches."
29
The SPP endears itself to existing and potential partners by promoting lasting cooperation and emphasizing non-kinetic approaches. Compared to the "here today and gone tomorrow" model of theatre security cooperation, the SPP presents a unique opportunity for NG forces to endure on target-a forum to demonstrate who we are as Americans and how a partner nation could benefit from a relationship with the U.S. The 20-year history of the SPP has shown that 50% of a partnership's original participants are likely to be actively engaged 7-10 years after the first meeting. 30 Additionally, the SPP is a non-kinetic approach to enhancing cooperation, where the success of American security efforts over the next two decades will depend on how well we effectively partner during the light of day as much or more as how well we kill our enemies in the dead of night. 31 This soft power approach in peace, one that combines diplomatic and military instruments of national power, establishes the context for hard power cooperation in the future, a precedent exemplified in state and partner nations deploying together to combat AORs.
These SPP benefits have not gone unnoticed by our nation's top military leadership. 
SPP-Highest Level DoD Support

SPP-Unexpected Benefits
The more robust and mature SPP relationships have produced benefits well outside the 
SPP Role in the Rebalance to Asia
The SPP is a proven model of alliance building poised to assume increased strategic Oregon to encourage this relationship? 41 The SPP is truly a conduit to assist in growing the face of America's engagement activity beyond the standard, military presentation. 44 If a cold-start decision had been forced upon Vietnam three years ago without the opportunity for interaction and trust-building, the answer may very well have been "no." It is widely believed by officials at the US Embassy that the Vietnamese government viewed a formal relationship with the National Guard much more palatable than one with U.S. active duty forces because it would be viewed as less aggressive in eyes of the Chinese. 45 Oregon's partnership with Vietnam demonstrates the four-fold reality of the SPP: the program is successful in forging new alliances, our partner is presumably reassured by this new arrangement, they will be increasingly positioned to provide for more of their own security based on expertise gained from the partnership, and perhaps most importantly, this will all occur below the threshold of China's attention.
Recommendation
Funding is the primary barrier to expanding the SPP further into Asia. Combatant My number one priority is to ensure that we have properly reassured our allies and that we have properly defended our own homeland and we will position our assets necessary to do that."
46 Admiral Locklear's understanding of the 21 st century security environment perhaps best summarizes the importance of funding the SPP: "In this extremely diverse and complex environment that must rely on a patchwork quilt of security relationships to ensure relative peace, can we, together, create an Indo-Pacific security environment that is resilient enough to withstand shocks and aftershocks that will occur in this complex environment, all the while maintaining relative peace and stability?" 47 If Admiral Locklear's 30 November 2012 meeting 48 with General Frank J. Grass, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to discuss the SPP is any indication, expansion of the SPP into the PACOM AOR is a low-cost, high-yield priority trending in a positive direction.
Conclusion
The United States must commit to long-term alliance building as part of a broader acknowledgement of China's ascendancy. The nature of the rebalance-whether viewed either pessimistically as a reaction to a threat, or optimistically as an opportunity to expand our regional alliances-will be interpreted as less threatening to China if characterized by programs such as the SPP. The stakes are high, and American foreign policy must remain engaged, especially when budgets are low, intentions uncertain, and internal skepticism rampant. "Beleaguered by headlines about the inexorable rise of China, setbacks in Afghanistan, the weakness of the Pakistani state, the Iranian nuclear challenge, the continuing danger of terrorist attack, the fragility of the international financial system, and the complex threats posed by climate change, leaders in Washington might be forgiven for believing that America's moment has passed, and that the best the United States can hope for is to play defense in 'someone else's century.' They would be mistaken." 49 The SPP confronts such disbelief by prioritizing longevity over convenience, quality over quantity, listening over speaking, and mutual cooperation over unilateral mandate. The ensuing leverage afforded to both parties serves as a hedge for uncertain times. For such a small investment, who wouldn't want such an inexpensive insurance policy?
